Little choice for IAF

IN the Medium-range Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) sweepstakes, the Indian Air Force (IAF) is confronted with many choices, all of them bad.Whatever the IAF’s reasons for wanting a new aircraft, the government means to use the deal to make international political capital, gain leverage in bilateral relations, and cement a strategic partnership. The Air Staff Quality Requirements – insofar as these can be deduced – are opaque.Is the IAF in the market for an aircraft to carry a heavy weapon load over a long distance in extended regional operations, or for a warplane to augment its existing strength in localised air defence, strike, and similar short-legged, Pakistan-centric, missions? This fuzziness, deliberate or not, will help the government to make the final selection, based less on technological trends or performance parameters than on the basis of which purchase best serves the country’s larger strategic interests. The candidate aircraft are currently undergoing flight tests in diverse Indian conditions – desert, high altitude, and high humidity – to determine their utility. If the aim is to get the maximum political bang for the buck for the $10.4 billion for a fleet of 126 MMRCA and the lucrative opportunity to sell other military hardware in the future and to enhance the supplier country’s political influence and its trade, technology, and military footprint in India, Delhi better secure a lot more than just some flying machines.The irony is that India’s desire for a new fighter plane is in the context of even the cutting edge manned aircraft obsolescing so fast as to become expensive museum pieces before they serve out their 30-year life span with the IAF. Had the IAF been visionary in its approach, it would have foreseen the end of the “man in the loop.” As a habitual laggard, however, the IAF seems satisfied with equipping itself fully for yesterday’s war.Worse, unlike the Indian Navy with its warship directorate, the IAF has no in-house expertise in designing aircraft and never acquired a stake in indigenous manufacture. Dispassionate analyses suggest that it matches or surpasses either of the American aircraft in the race and, in its more advanced configuration, can outperform even the Joint Strike Fighter F-35, a plane Lockheed Martin have promised to replace the F-16 with on a “one for one” basis were India to buy the latter aircraft. Transacting with Sweden, France, and the Western European countries will not fetch India the same political and strategic returns as engaging with the United States or Russia. Moreover, because the Indian Armed Services have a record of choosing equipment from a supplier country the government prefers, the suspicion that the MMRCA decision will be driven by considerations of international politics, gains credence. The test data will be the means of winnowing the field without alienating anybody too much.The upside of buying American is obvious: it will give teeth to the military cooperation arrangement, emphasising, among other things, inter-operability of military systems envisaged by the 2005 Defence Framework Agreement that both countries see as central to containing an ambitious and fast-growing China. The Russian military cooperation with India has also been predicated on the joint need to deal with the common Chinese threat. Buying the F-16 or F-18 will upset Moscow, which perceives the MMRCA decision as something of a litmus test of its continued good standing with India. Indian armed forces still depend on Russia for about 70 percent of their equipment needs. The souring of the Russian attitude towards India, moreover, may have other consequences as well, such as a cutback in the Russian involvement in many high value military technology collaboration projects, raising of the acquisition cost of other items, and delays in the contracted delivery of, say, the nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine Akula on lease, and the aircraft carrier Gorshkov.Additionally, depending on how seriously Moscow takes this “affront,” there is the possibility of Russia making common cause with China in denying India a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, a seat India craves.Delhi will have to make a judgment call on two things: on the United States as a reliable strategic partner and military supplier, and on the implications of such a supplier relationship for India’s independent posture. The US, on the other hand, is an unknown commodity, insisting that its partners adhere to its policy guidelines and with a worrying record of violating contractual, even treaty, obligations and treating its military customers in a high-handed and arbitrary manner.Bharat Karnad is a Research Professor in National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi. He is a CASI Fall 2009 Visiting Scholar

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